Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from Romania by Trif, Aurora
www.ssoar.info
Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe: Case
Study Evidence from Romania
Trif, Aurora
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Trif, A. (2007). Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe: Case Study Evidence from Romania. European Journal of
Industrial Relations, 13(2), 237-256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680107078256
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-222829
Aurora Trif
University College Dublin, IRELAND
Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe:
Case Study Evidence from Romania
ABSTRACT ■ This article compares collective bargaining practices in
Romania after 1989 with those in continental Western Europe. It focuses on
the structures, processes and outcomes of collective bargaining in four large
chemical companies; comparisons are also made with other Eastern
European countries. Unexpectedly, the findings point to an increase in state
intervention in establishing terms and conditions of employment after 1989.
The development of collective bargaining in Romania appears to follow a
nation-specific path, with the continuance of certain pre-1989 features, such
as unclear boundaries between trade unions and management.
KEYWORDS: case study ■ collective bargaining ■ Eastern Europe
■ industrial relations ■ Romania
Introduction
Despite many studies of recent developments in collective bargaining in
Eastern European countries (Janssen and Galgóczi, 2004; Ladó, 2002;
Schulten, 2005), there is still debate about the degree to which practices
resemble those in continental Western Europe. This article aims to inform
this debate, using an actor-centered institutionalist approach to analyse
institutional continuity and change in collective bargaining in four large
chemical companies in Romania. It evaluates how far practices in Romania
resemble those in continental Western Europe, and also offers comparisons
with other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs).
Unlike in Poland and Hungary, the transformation process in Romania
started from scratch in 1989, as it had one of the most centralized politico–
economic systems in Eastern Europe. The unfavourable initial conditions
and gradual approach to transformation led to a very long economic reces-
sion. Despite economic growth since 2000, GDP in Romania returned to
the 1989 level only in 2004. Output in the chemicals sector fell by about 
60 percent (OECD, 1998).
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In order to assess collective bargaining practices in Romania, three key
features are examined: first, its structural characteristics, in particular the
perception of respondents on how the mechanism of collective bargaining
was established after 1989. Second, the process of negotiation between
parties and their influence in determining selected conditions of employ-
ment. It was expected that the legislation after 1989 allowing trade unions
and employers to negotiate voluntary collective agreements would lead to a
decrease in the role of statutory regulation, while the influence of employ-
ers and trade unions would increase; but the evidence points to an increase
in state intervention. Finally, the outcomes of collective bargaining are
examined. Although findings across CEECs revealed several comparable
changes and continuities, the development of collective bargaining in
Romania appears to follow a nation-specific path.
Methodology
The four companies investigated reveal some major issues faced by large
companies after 1989. As the economic recession led to a reduction of the
domestic market, they had to export more than half of their products in
order to survive. All four companies had major job losses and three were
not profitable for several years (see Table 1). Each company had at least one
union, to which more than 85 percent of the labour force belonged. Two
of the case studies (referred to as S1 and S2) were privatized companies and
two (P1 and P2) were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The private com-
panies had limited foreign ownership (Dutch in S1 and Japanese in S2), but
the main shareholders were Romanian. Since large domestically owned
companies (particularly SOEs) are generally less restructured than foreign-
owned companies or small firms (Carlin et al., 1994), and large companies
currently employ less than half the Romanian labour force, there is likely
to be more institutional continuity in the case studies than the average in
Romania.
The study uses quantitative and qualitative data. An employee survey
was conducted, with 125 questionnaires distributed in each company via the
personnel department. Response rates were very high (123 in S1, 119 in S2,
89 in P1 and 117 in P2). Respondents were selected by stratified random
sampling of different employment categories; on average, 77.5 percent were
blue-collar workers, 13 percent white-collar and 9.5 percent managers. The
survey findings are considered representative for each company investi-
gated, but it is acknowledged that bias might have occurred because the per-
sonnel department distributed the questionnaires. However, it was specified
in the questionnaire that the study was independent academic research.
In addition to this survey, seven officials from national (intersectoral)
institutions – representing the state, employers’ associations and trade
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(2)
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unions were interviewed, and nine from the chemicals sector. A further
65 interviews were conducted with union officials, shop stewards, human
resource managers and employees in the four companies. Thus, this art-
icle provides evidence on the perceptions of workers on collective bar-
gaining as well as those of union officials and managers.
The validity of the findings is limited by the fact that they reflect the
perceptions of respondents and could not be systematically compared to
previous data; the author found no previous case study research on
industrial relations in Romania. Thus, the primary data could only be
compared to evidence from other CEECs. Although the company is the
most important bargaining level in Eastern Europe (Schulten, 2005), case
study evidence on collective bargaining practices is very scarce.
Conceptual Framework – An Actor-Centred 
Institutional Approach
Path-dependence has been a key concept in the analysis of the transform-
ation of industrial relations in CEECs (Kohl and Platzer, 2003; Pollert,
1999; Stark, 1992). Stark (1992: 20–1) indicates that the central point of
the path-dependency paradigm is that:
social change is not a process either directed from above or initiated from
below but a result of interactions in which the designs of transformation
are themselves transformed, shaped, and modified in response to, and
even in anticipation of, the actions of subordinate social groups.
According to this interpretation, the outcome of the transformation is
neither determined by the voluntary strategies of the main parties
involved nor by external factors, but it is rooted in the historical legacies,
traditions and cultural norms in the period before and during the com-
munist period.
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
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TABLE 1 Profile of the Four Case Studies in 2001
Company Ownership Branch Number of Jobs lost Profitable
(% of main Employees since 
shareholders) 1989(%)
S1 Private since Petrochemical 3668 30 Yes
2000 (70)
S2 Private since Rubber 2000 53 No
1995 (85)
P1 Public (90) Petrochemical 6160 23 No
P2 Public (70.5) Chemical 1414 55 No
Source: Human Resource Departments.
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Recent studies attempt to provide more rigorous theoretical frame-
works for path-dependency analysis (Avdagic, 2005). Mahoney (2000)
distinguishes mechanisms of institutional reproduction from mecha-
nisms of change, and identifies four main types of path dependency
explanations. First, in the case of utilitarian explanations, the institution
is reproduced through a rational cost–benefit assessment of actors, whilst
change is determined by increased competitive pressures and learning
from previous experiences. Second, in a functional explanation, an insti-
tution is reproduced because it serves a necessary function for the over-
all system, while an exogenous shock is needed to transform the system.
Third, the power explanation refers to the fact that an institution is
reproduced because it is supported by an elite group of actors. The mech-
anism of change is related to power dynamics, specifically a decline in the
power of elites and an increase in that of other groups. Finally, the legit-
imization explanation refers to the fact that institutions are reproduced
because actors believe them to be morally just.
Apart from its lack of coherence, path dependence is criticized because
it does not explain the emergence of the institutions and how substantial
change in institutions may occur (Mahoney, 2000). Additionally, in the
context of the transformation process in CEECs, Pollert (1999) criticizes
it as being deterministic, underplaying the role of exogenous factors, and
because it is speculative rather than empirically grounded. Also, Avdagic
(2005) presents convincing arguments against the determinism of path-
dependence. Although path-dependence explains the role of the past leg-
acies well, its determinism and complexity are important shortcomings
for explaining changes in collective bargaining in CEECs.
A theoretical approach that relaxes the deterministic assumptions of tra-
ditional path-dependency, by arguing that actors have certain degrees of
choice in selecting their strategies, is the actor-centered institutionalist
approach (Scharpf, 1997). Müller-Jentsch (2004) applies this approach to
industrial relations: institutions ought to be the main focus of analysis, but
they need to be understood as an interaction between actors and the insti-
tutional context. The creation and the modification of labour institutions is
an evolutionary process primarily determined by the power and counter-
power of the participating actors. This argument is largely consistent with
Mahoney’s (2000) power explanation of path-dependence, while it is speci-
fically operationalized for industrial relations.
Müller-Jentsch indicates that this approach consists of three analytical
layers: the historic-constitutional analysis of actors and institutions, the
arena and the negotiation concepts. The arena is the forum where nego-
tiations and conflicts between the actors takes place (e.g. collective bar-
gaining), limiting their choices but allowing them some discretion to
negotiate. The negotiation concept refers to cooperative and conflictive
interactions between the actors and the outcomes of the negotiation
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process. This article focuses on the arena for collective bargaining and nego-
tiation concepts, because a historic-constitutional analysis of actors and
labour institutions in Romania has been examined in other studies (Trif,
2004).
It is expected that after a historical turning point, such as the fall of
communist regimes, the process of building and reforming institutions is
path-dependent. The development of labour institutions is likely to fol-
low nation-specific paths, while variation within a specific country may
exist because of different power dynamics between the local actors
(Avdagic, 2005; Müller-Jentsch, 2004).
Collective Bargaining in Eastern and Western Europe
Despite large variations in collective bargaining mechanisms across coun-
tries, there are some basic common characteristics specific to a politico–
economic system. Table 2 outlines the main common features of collective
bargaining in centrally planned and market-based economies. During the
communist period, collective bargaining was not an essential mechanism
for setting the terms and conditions of employment. Generally, the state
determined wages directly by setting wage scales and wage funds for
enterprises, or indirectly by regulations based on the central plan (Héthy,
1991). In countries such as Hungary and Poland (where there was a
degree of decentralization) limited collective bargaining at company level
took place (Héthy, 1991; Pravda and Ruble, 1986), but in Romania there
was no tradition of voluntary collective bargaining.
In contrast, collective bargaining has been the main mechanism for
establishing terms and conditions of employment in Western Europe
since the Second World War (Traxler and Behrens, 2002). Its structure
varies greatly across countries, but multi-employer bargaining is predom-
inant in Western Europe (Schulten, 2005). Employers have generally more
power than unions (as they own the resources), while the relations
between the two parties may vary from cooperative to adversarial (Crouch,
1993). For the state and employers, the main functions of collective bar-
gaining in a market economy are to ensure social peace and enhance effi-
ciency, while for employees it provides a protective function (Traxler, 1998).
These basic features of collective bargaining in Western Europe are used as
a benchmark to evaluate developments in CEECs, especially in Romania.
Throughout CEECs, voluntary collective bargaining was made legally
possible from the beginning of the 1990s (Ladó, 2002). As Table 2 shows,
collective bargaining coverage is far lower than in Western Europe and
single-employer bargaining prevails. The low coverage in CEECs is associ-
ated with the decentralized structure of collective bargaining and low level
of organization of both employees and employers. The weak development
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
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TABLE 2. Basic Features of Collective Bargaining in Eastern and 
Western Europe
Collective CEECs Continental CEECs 
bargaining pre-1989 Western Europe after 1989
Legislative Statutory Voluntary Elements of 
Framework legislation mechanism, but  voluntary 
(coercive) some statutory mechanism, but
regulation heavily regulated
by legislation
Coverage 100 percent, 65 percent in most 40 percent in
but no genuine countries most countries
bargaining
Structure
Level/Type To a reduced Sectoral/ Company/Single 
degree at multi-employer employer bargaining 
company level predominant predominant
Parties Trade union Trade union and Trade union and
and State employers’ (usually) individual 
association or employer
individual
employer
Power Trade unions Employers generally Private employers far 
relations subordinated stronger than stronger than 
to the (party-) unions unions
state
Process
Type of Cooperation (no Cooperative and Cooperative and 
relations right to strike)a adversarial adversarial (right to 
(right to strike) strike)
Outcomes
For the state Legitimacy Increase efficiency Legitimacy, social 
and social peace peace
For employers Not applicable Increased labour Legitimacy, conflict 
productivity, resolution
conflict
resolution
For employees Certain Voice and distributive Predominantly voice 
distributive (substantive and (procedural rules)
function procedural rules)
(substantive
rules)
aExcept Poland after 1982 and to certain extent in Hungary from the 1970s.
Source: Héthy (1991); Schulten (2005).
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of sectoral bargaining is generally explained in terms inherited institutional
legacies (strong legal intervention and company-based trade unions) as
well as employers’ preferences (Draus, 2001; Tóth, 1997). Nevertheless, the
coverage of collective agreements varies in CEECs, from below 20 percent
in Latvia and Lithuania to 100 percent in Slovenia (Schulten, 2005).
The emerging similarities and differences in collective bargaining prac-
tices at company level in CEECs are not well documented. Aro and Repo
(1997) conducted in 1995–6 the only comparative survey in this area.
However, while the survey only presents the perceptions of trade union
negotiators in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
and has certain methodological shortcomings (e.g. sample size varying
greatly across countries), it is still the most comprehensive comparative
study available. Overall, their findings indicate that there are important
differences in collective bargaining practices across countries.
The survey findings are largely confirmed by Thirkell et al. (1995),
who examined 14 companies in the same five countries. However, Aro
and Repo (1997) found greater union influence on terms and conditions
of employment, despite a decrease in union density, while other studies
indicated a decline of union influence at company level, particularly in pri-
vate companies (Pollert, 1999, 2000; Thirkell et al., 1995). Additionally,
case study evidence reveals major differences between large manufactur-
ing companies in each country in terms of collective bargaining practices
and the strength of trade unions (Pollert, 1999; Thirkell et al., 1995). Thus,
there is disagreement about the influence of the parties on collective bar-
gaining and there is virtually no evidence on collective bargaining prac-
tices at company level in Romania.
Structural Characteristics of Collective Bargaining 
in Romania
Heavy Statutory Regulation of the Collective Bargaining Mechanism
In Romania, legislation regulates the mechanism of collective bargaining
to a higher degree than in other CEECs (Clarke et al., 2003). The law
allows only a single collective agreement to be negotiated at national, sect-
oral and company levels, which should cover all employees in the bar-
gaining unit. It also stipulates the requirements which should be fulfilled
for the parties to be allowed to negotiate at each level. Additionally, it
indicates the minimal scope of a collective agreement and requires that
provisions in collective agreements at lower levels must be similar or
more favourable for employees than those at higher levels.
Interviewees revealed that the legislative framework was negotiated
between the government and trade unions. Both parties have achieved
certain advantages. For the government, the establishment of (more or less)
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
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free collective bargaining was part of the democratization process that
enhanced their legitimacy. For (representative) trade unions, it guaranteed
that each employer (in companies with more than 21 employees) or repre-
sentative employers’ association is obliged to negotiate with them. In 2005,
foreign investors had tried to remove this obligation during the revision of
the Labour Code, but the unions managed to preserve it. Despite major
constraints during the shift from centrally planned economies to market-
based economies, developments in Romania show that unions have import-
ant influence on the establishment of labour institutions.
Decentralized Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining has become an important mechanism through which
terms and conditions of employment are established in Romania. The
multi-sector national agreement for 2005–06 formally covers all employees.
In 2005, 86 percent of the labour force was covered by sectoral agreements
(Preda, 2006). However, agreements concluded at national and sectoral
levels only provide minimal frameworks for negotiations at company level.
Despite being covered by national and sectoral agreements, in all four case
studies, respondents indicated that the company is the most important level
where the actual terms and conditions of employment are set.
A decentralized structure of collective bargaining is very common in
CEECs. The inherited legacies, particularly the existence of company
unions alongside a weak development of employers’ associations, fre-
quently made company collective bargaining the only option available
(Ladó, 2002). In Romania, a single collective agreement that covers all
employees seems to be a continuation of the pre-1989 era ideology, which
did not tolerate pluralism and competition. On the other hand, the policy
to introduce a market-based economy along with the increase of un-
employment, strengthened employers’ bargaining power. Additionally, in
the ambiguous transition context, employers preferred to determine the
terms and conditions of employment at company level. Furthermore, there
has been an increase of single-employer bargaining even in Western Europe
(Schulten, 2005), to allow more flexibility at company level to adapt to
changes in the economic environment. Therefore, inherited legacies along
with a general economic and political environment that supports market
forces resulted in a collective bargaining structure far more decentralized in
most CEECs than in Western Europe.
Weak Representativeness of the Parties
A precondition for collective bargaining is the existence of independent
parties whose members are willing to delegate authority to the representative
organizations. In three out of the four companies investigated, respondents
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have doubts about the degree of independence of the unions from the man-
agement. Their suspicions are substantiated by the interview data. For
example, in company S2 the management provides similar facilities for offi-
cials of the two trade unions as for top managers, and pays their wages. In
P2, the leader of the union negotiation team in 2000 was part of the man-
agement negotiating team in 2001 (as he was not re-elected as a union offi-
cial). These practices appear to be a heritage of pre-1989 era, but generally,
trade unions are not totally subordinated to management and employees
can change union officials, as P2 demonstrates. Nevertheless, the findings
indicate that the lack of a clear line between the management and trade
unions has remained in some companies.
Evidence shows that the authority given to the negotiating parties to
make concessions during the bargaining process varies across companies.
Trade unions could make independent decisions and alter the claims
drafted in advance in all four cases, while employer representatives
adjusted their original claims in only two. In company P1, respondents
reported that top managers did not have the mandate to modify the deci-
sions defined in advance, while in S2, top managers could impose their
will. This evidence substantiates the findings of Aro and Repo (1997) in
other CEECs, by demonstrating that employer representatives have, at
times, sufficient bargaining power to refuse any concessions. With regard
to the authority given to the trade unions, it appears that Romanian
unions are closer to the Hungarian ones, having a high degree of freedom
to adjust their initial claims (Aro and Repo, 1997).
Bargaining resulted in a collective agreement in each company investi-
gated. These were recorded in writing and did not seem to be approved
by anybody other than the negotiation team. In conformity with the legis-
lation, the agreements were validated and registered by the appropriate
district labour inspectorate and subsequently they covered all employees.
Most CEECs have written collective agreements which have to be regis-
tered with a specialized state agency (Schulten, 2005). However, it is not
clear if this reflects a persistence of bureaucratic routines which existed
during the communist period, because this practice is also found in some
Western European countries (e.g. Germany and France) (Schulten, 2005).
Collective Bargaining after 1989
The Impact of the State on Terms and Conditions of Employment
Considering that the state established the terms and conditions of
employment before 1989, it was expected that its influence on terms and
conditions of employment would decrease with progressive adoption of
pluralist legislation. However, survey data presented in Table 3 indicate
that in the opinion of 43 percent respondents on average, the influence of
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
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statutory legislation on terms and conditions of employment increased,
while only 12 percent considered that it decreased. In contrast to other
findings in CEECs (Ladó, 2002; Pollert, 1999), respondents perceived
that the state has more freedom to intervene in industrial relations than
before 1989.
Nevertheless, fewer than a third of respondents consider that the state
still has a high influence on pay, while more than two-thirds perceive that
the state has a strong influence on working hours and working condi-
tions (Figure 1). Overall, respondents consider that the impact of the
state on terms and conditions of employment increased rather than
decreased after 1989.
The highest proportion of respondents who considered that state
influence had increased was in company S1, where the state had a huge
impact on job security on two occasions. In 1997, the company was
almost closed down as it was making huge losses; and in 2000, the state
agencies managed the process which resulted in a privatization contract
that obliged the new owner to preserve the existing number of jobs for
Statutory legislation
0
25
50
75
100
Company
Percentage
Pay
Working hours
Working conditions
Social benefits
S1 S2 P1 P2 Unweighted
average
FIGURE 1. Percentage of Respondents Considering that Statutory
Legislation has a High Influence on Selected Terms and Conditions of
Employment 
TABLE 3. Influence of Statutory Legislation on Terms and Conditions of
Employment after 1989 (% of Respondents)
Company Increased No Decreased Don’t Did not work Number 
change know before 1989 respondents
S1 60.0 20.0 3.3 7.5 9.2 120
S2 31.0 21.2 15.0 15.9 16.8 113
P1 34.8 22.5 14.6 11.2 16.9 89
P2 45.6 17.5 15.8 13.2 7.9 114
Unweighted 43.6 20.2 11.9 11.9 12.4 Total 436
average
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the next five years. Taking into account that between 23 percent and 55 per-
cent of employees lost their jobs after 1989 in the four companies investi-
gated, it is natural that employees are more concerned with job security
than with the level of pay or other terms and conditions of employment.
Although the Romanian state does not always enforce financial discipline
(Dochia, 2000), employees perceive intensely the threat of losing their jobs
after 1989, when companies such as S1 temporarily stopped operating or
were closed down. Employees’ perception of the increase in the state inter-
vention at company level after 1989 seems to be linked to an expanding state
jurisdiction in other areas, such as the privatization process and enforcing
financial discipline, which are closely linked with job security.
The Impact of Employers and Top Managers on Terms and
Conditions of Employment
An important obstacle to the development of sectoral collective bargain-
ing in CEECs is the unwillingness of employers to delegate negotiating
powers to employers’ associations (Tóth, 1997). They have enough
authority at company level to determine the terms and conditions of
employment as they desire. Table 4 indicates that the influence of the top
managers increased in the opinion of 55 percent of the respondents, on
average in the four companies examined, while only 14 percent considered
that it decreased.
Additionally, more than 75 percent of the respondents indicated that
top managers have a strong influence over specific terms and conditions
of employment, such as pay and working conditions (Figure 2). This con-
firms the expectation that the influence of employers or their representa-
tives (top managers) over terms and conditions of employment would
increase with the progressive adoption of pluralist legislation, and sub-
stantiates other findings in CEECs which indicated that poor develop-
ment of the employers’ associations is associated with strong employer
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
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TABLE 4. Influence of Top Managers on Terms and Conditions of Employment
after 1989 (% of Respondents)
Company Increased The Decreased Don’t Did not Number
same Know work respondents
before 1989
S1 77.2 7.3 2.4 3.3 9.8 123
S2 56.1 10.5 5.3 10.5 17.5 114
P1 39.3 19.1 6.7 18.0 16.9 89
P2 45.6 17.5 22.8 6.1 7.9 114
Unweighted 54.6 13.6 9.3 9.5 13.0 Total 440
average
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influence at company level, particularly in the private sector (Martin,
1999; Pollert, 2000).
The Impact of Trade Unions on Terms and Conditions of
Employment
The collapse of the communist regime gave unions the opportunity to
negotiate collective agreements with employers. Survey data presented in
Table 5 show that on average, more than 50 percent of the respondents
consider that trade union influence increased in the four companies inves-
tigated. Aro and Repo (1997) found a similar trend in other CEECs: union
influence increased between 1992 and 1995 in more than 30 percent of the
bargaining units investigated. A Romanian union representative indicated
that immediately after 1989 the unions were very strong and some had
extreme demands, but as they got more experience, they became more real-
istic and constructive. In addition, the economic recession and increased
unemployment reduced trade union power in the second half of the 1990s.
Collective bargaining is generally the most important function of trade
unions in a market economy. Figure 3 indicates that on average, more than
TABLE 5. Influence of Trade Unions on Terms and Conditions of Employment
after 1989 (% of Respondents)
Company Increased The Decreased Don’t Did not work Number
same know before 1989 respondents
S1 81.3 6.5 2.4 0.8 8.9 123
S2 35.4 19.8 18.1 9.5 17.2 115
P1 56.2 11.2 11.2 4.5 16.9 89
P2 50.9 20.2 18.4 2.7 7.9 114
Unweighted 56.0 14.4 12.5 4.4 12.7 Total 441
average
Top managers
0
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50
75
100
S1 S2 P1 P2 Unweighted
averageCompany
Percentage
Pay
Working hours
Working conditions
Social benefits
FIGURE 2. Percentage of Respondents Considering that Top Managers
have a High Influence on Selected Terms and Conditions of Employment
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50 percent of respondents consider that trade unions have a high influence
on specific terms and conditions of employment. Their highest impact is
on social benefits, followed closely by working conditions and pay.
Despite very high union density in all four companies, there is variation
in union influence on terms and conditions of employment. The largest
difference is between the two private companies S1 and S2. Company S1
is part of a profitable and growing corporation, while the holding group
to which company S2 belongs has serious financial difficulties, hence it
appears that the financial situation of the company has an important
impact on trade union influence. Respondents from S2 indicated that
trade union influence decreased after 1997, when company profits were
declining. Nevertheless, loss-making companies may have a strong union,
as illustrated by the case of a SOE in Poland (Thirkell et al., 1995).
Another key factor that affects the influence of trade unions at com-
pany level is the commitment of union leaders to protect workers’ interests.
As noted above, the employer pays trade union leaders in the company
S2 and they have similar facilities to those of the top managers. As a result,
they are not enthusiastic in protecting employees’ interests, considering
that they may lose the benefits provided by the employer. Furthermore,
the fact that S2 was privatized five years earlier than S1 may indicate that
privatization has reduced trade union power. Therefore, the findings sug-
gest that the financial situation of the company and the commitment of
union leaders to protect employees’ interests have an important effect on
union bargaining power, while it is not clear if privatization causes a
decline in trade union influence as some studies suggest (Pollert, 1999).
The Key Bargaining Issues: Wages and Social Benefits
The main issues negotiated at company level were wages, social benefits,
working conditions, job security, working hours, holidays, facilities 
for trade union activities and disciplinary and grievance procedures. 
Trade unions
0
25
50
75
100
S1 S2 P1 P2 Unweighted
averageCompany
Percentage
Pay
Working hours
Working conditions
Social benefits
FIGURE 3. Percentage of Respondents Considering that Trade Unions
have a High Influence on Selected Terms and Conditions of Employment
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As Thirkell et al. (1995) found, the scope of collective bargaining was
extended after 1989, but a degree of continuity from pre-1989 era still exists.
Working hours are tightly regulated by the Labour Code: generally,
employees should work eight hours per day and 40 hours per week.
Maximum working hours are nine per day and 48 per week. Working
time had been an issue in all four companies, not because of demands for
a reduction of working hours, but because employees asked management
to provide sufficient raw materials to work continuously to receive their
full wage. Trade union officials indicated that it has been very difficult to
negotiate terms and conditions of employment when shortages of raw
materials caused interruptions to production. The key issue was thus to
ensure continuity of work during the legally permitted working time.
As legislation leaves little room to modify working time, wages are the
main bargaining issue in all four companies. Remuneration clauses defined
a basic wage based on qualifications, supplements for special conditions
(up to 25 percent of the basic wage) and individual seniority bonuses.
In addition, in companies S2 and P2 there were collective or individual
performance-related bonuses. In the petrochemical complexes S1 and P1,
where production depends primarily on technology and the quality of the
raw materials, there was a time-based wage system. Thus, the wage struc-
ture has changed to a certain extent (being linked to collective or individ-
ual performance when possible), but qualifications and seniority are still
important criteria in establishing remuneration, as before 1989.
During the communist period, managers could not motivate employ-
ees because of low wages and small wage differentials (Héthy, 1991).
Evidence suggests that this problem still exist in three of the companies.
Except in company S1, wages barely cover the cost of living. Managers
have the authority to discipline workers, but not to reward them. A line
manager said: ‘I can only sanction employees, but I cannot give them any
bonus … In addition, the wage is so low that I think their family would
not have enough money for the basic needs, so often I do not penalize
them at all.’ However, those with poor disciplinary records were the first
to be made redundant, and the threat of losing their job is likely to make
employees work harder.
In each company more than 80 percent of respondents consider that
top managers have a high influence on wages (Figure 2), while around
half of respondents indicate that on average trade unions have strong
influences on wages (Figure 3). As in Western Europe, collective bar-
gaining is the main mechanism that sets wages in large companies with a
unionized labour force, with employers having a higher influence on
wages than trade unions.
Social benefits are another key bargaining issue. The collective agree-
ment in each company includes provision for subsidies of around 50 per-
cent for holiday tickets, premia for Easter and Christmas, and food
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vouchers. Medical services are provided in all four companies and in two
of them the facilities have been improved since 1989. In addition, com-
pany P1 had a leisure complex for employees. All companies had stopped
providing flats for employees, but the two private companies still have
subsidized hostels.
The survey shows that, as with wages, top managers have the highest
influence in determining social benefits (Figure 2), but union influence is
also strong (Figure 3). It appears that management and employees have a
common interest in certain social benefits. According to a human resource
manager, because of low living standards, a free lunch is likely to improve
labour productivity. Moreover, food vouchers provided by the employer
are exempt from tax. Health services with staff specialized in dealing with
company-specific complaints are likely to reduce absenteeism, as there are
frequent accidents in the production sections. A blue-collar worker said
that ‘almost everybody had a work accident. I inhaled ammonia in 1991 and
I was scalded with hot water in 1993.’ Public health services are theoretic-
ally free of charge, but in practice it is very common to give a substantial
‘compensation’ in order to get adequate treatment.
The persistence of social benefits distributed by the company has been
found in other CEECs: large enterprises have maintained their social role
in guaranteeing a minimum standard of protection in an unstable and
unpredictable environment, when the state fails to provide an adequate
safety net. For instance, Aro and Repo (1997) found that health services
existed in more than 70 percent of the units investigated in Slovakia, the
Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the provisions in the four
companies investigated are likely to be more extensive than the average
in Romania, as these companies are very large and highly unionized.
Collective Disputes at Company Level
Industrial action at company level is relatively rare in Romania (Martin,
1999); collective agreements are generally concluded through dialogue
and compromise between trade unions and employers’ representatives,
but mediation or arbitration are used when necessary, as in Western
European countries. However, there have been collective disputes in the
companies investigated. In P2, according to a trade union official, no
agreement was reached after two months of negotiations in 2001, because
management did not want to conclude the agreement. The union regis-
tered a dispute with the Ministry of Industry, and a week later manage-
ment signed the agreement. There was also a dispute in S2 in 2001,
because wages and bonuses stipulated in the collective agreement were
not paid on time. It started with a protest demonstration organized by
the trade unions, but subsequently the majority of employees refused to
start work until they had a response to their demands. The unions did not
Trif: Collective Bargaining in Eastern Europe
251
237-256 EJD-078256.qxd  2/6/07  4:42 PM  Page 251
support the stoppage (officials stayed inside of the company headquar-
ters as required by the management). Three days of strike and three days
lock-out did not hurt the employer, since there was a shortage of raw
materials at the time. Eventually the employees received the disputed
wages and bonuses, but later than stipulated in the collective agreement.
The majority of interviewees, including trade union representatives,
considered that a strike should be used only in extreme cases (e.g. against
company closure), while all other issues should be resolved through dia-
logue. Such opinions might be a linked to the pre-1989 unitarist culture,
but may also be due to the problems of company survival and conse-
quential job insecurity. In addition, since chemical installations are sup-
posed to work continuously, it is not easy to stop production, and restart-
ing production at the specified parameters is a long and difficult process.
Hence attitudes may be different in other sectors.
The Outcomes of Collective Bargaining
It appears that the minimal frameworks agreed at national and sectoral
levels along with decentralized collective bargaining rarely result in posi-
tive outcomes for the three parties. For the state, sectoral collective agree-
ments have not ensured increased efficiency in the chemicals sector; com-
panies which do not implement even the minimal terms and conditions
of employment are forced neither by the state nor by trade unions to go
out of business. The impact of collective bargaining on social peace is not
clear: in most CEECs the number of strikes decreased during the 1990s,
but collective agreement coverage also declined (Schulten, 2005). For
employers, collective bargaining did not result in profitability in three
of the companies investigated, although it is possible that it contributed
to improved labour productivity and conflict resolution. For employees,
collective bargaining has given a voice in establishing terms and con-
ditions of employment, but in the three non-profitable companies they
have low wages and high job insecurity. Nevertheless, their situation
might be even worse without collective bargaining and trade union
representation.
Company S1, by contrast, had considerable profits and virtually all
respondents were content with their terms and conditions of employ-
ment; a blue-collar worker said that wages are around five times higher
than the average in Romania. Additionally, the collective agreement
ensures job security, individual health insurance as well as improvements
in medical services and working conditions. Given that a positive out-
come for capital and labour was found in the company with the strongest
union, it could be concluded that a balanced power relationship between
capital and labour is likely to result in benefits for both parties (Crouch,
1993).
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Nevertheless, a strong trade union is not enough to achieve a positive
outcome in the exchange between labour and capital (Thirkell et al.,
1995). In S1, both parties had negative outcomes during the 1990s when
the company made huge losses, despite having a strong independent
union. The company has become profitable and can afford to pay high
wages only because of a buyer with resources to make it profitable. The
new managerial team sought to achieve a committed labour force by pro-
viding high wages and training as well as involving employees collectively
and individually in organizational change. In the other three companies,
the outcome of the exchange between capital and labour was negative for
both parties, as they were not profitable for several years, while employ-
ees had low wages and high job insecurity. Despite over 85 percent union
density, top managers had a far stronger influence on wages than the
trade unions.
Conclusions
This study evaluates change and continuity in collective bargaining prac-
tices in Romania after 1989. The main change is the decentralization of bar-
gaining, reflected in the larger scope for establishing terms and conditions
of employment at company level and more authority delegated to trade
unions and top managers. In addition, the use of the strike as a (potential)
power resource for the unions is a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, there is
a persistence of high state intervention and the unitarist culture from the
pre-1989 period. Additionally, the unclear boundaries between employer
and employee representatives indicate that features of collective bargaining
in Romania are different from those in Western Europe. In line with the
path-dependency argument, the findings suggest that collective bargaining
in Romania was built on pre-existing structures and practices.
The main contribution of this article is to provide primary data on col-
lective bargaining practices in Romania after the fall of the communist
regime, in companies typical of those operating before 1989. The findings
confirm that the influence of top managers and trade unions in setting
terms and conditions of employment has increased, while state interven-
tion on pay has decreased. Nevertheless, respondents perceived an
increase in the state intervention at company level after 1989, because of
expanding of state jurisdiction in such areas as the management of the
privatization process and the enforcement of financial discipline, with
implications for job security. The state intervention discovered in the case
studies is likely to be higher than the average in Romania, because these
companies are very large and have limited foreign investment.
Although findings across CEECs reveal comparable changes and continu-
ities, collective bargaining in Romania appears to follow a nation-specific
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development path. In contrast to most CEECs, employers are obliged to
initiate the collective bargaining process in all companies with more than 
21 employees, and there is an extension mechanism at each level. Also, the
perception of an increase in state influence on terms of conditions of em-
ployment after 1989 was not found in other CEECs; it appears that the
Romanian state preserved its strong intervention in industrial relations
longer than elsewhere. However, its intervention at company level is likely
to decrease, as the privatization process is almost completed and more than
half the labour force currently works in foreign-owned companies.
Differences in collective bargaining across countries are likely to be
determined to a certain extent by dissimilarities in legislation, nationally
inherited legacies and the progress of economic reforms (Aro and Repo,
1997; Clarke et al., 2003). However, differences among companies inves-
tigated cannot be explained by such factors. The case of company S1
shows that the trade union and the top management played a crucial role in
establishing a collective bargaining mechanism that contributed to a positive
outcome for both parties. In a context where institutions are not well con-
solidated (Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 2000), the local power-holders have a
high degree of choice, as differences between the four case studies indicate.
Thus, the findings substantiate recent studies that relax the assumptions of
a deterministic path-dependency (Avdagic, 2005; Mahoney, 2000).
This article contributes to a deeper understanding of institutional
change in the context of a shift from a centrally planned to a market-
based economy. It appears that the historical legacies and the previous
institutional setting have played an important role during the transition
process (Clarke et al., 2003; Pollert, 1999). Nevertheless, the findings sug-
gest that collective bargaining varies across countries and companies,
being dependent on the co-evolution between the specific context and the
choices of power-holders, as actor-centred institutionalist approaches
claim. Considering the limited empirical data and the fact that labour
institutions are still in flux, further research is needed to give a compre-
hensive and conclusive answer to the debate of convergence versus diver-
gence in collective bargaining practices in Romania in comparison to
other CEECs and to continental Western Europe.
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